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exploration of pasts, presents and
futures
The Immanuel Wallerstein Chair Annual Lecture delivered by Peter J.
Taylor at the University of Ghent on October 21st, 2004
Peter J. Taylor
1  I will use a recent news story to introduce this lecture. Last week the media reported a
story with headlines such as: “Detroit to cut 10,000 jobs in Europe”. What does this mean?
Apart from the peculiar geography – it’s not a city but a firm (General Motors) that has
made the decision, and it’s not a “continent” that is affected but car plants mainly in
cities in one country (Germany) – there are two important features: first, the process is
transnational, and second, it is economic. In other words, it is an archetypal event that
has come to be called “globalization”, featuring a major corporation in one country
directly affecting the economy of another country.
2  This lecture is about globalization and its study, as interpreted by a world-systems analyst
(i.e.  me).  The  ideas  associated  with  globalization  and  world-systems  analysis  are
sometimes viewed as comparable and other times they are contrasted. Clearly I need to
engage in some careful definitional work before providing a new interpretation of how
world-systems analysis can inform our understanding of contemporary globalization.
Thus I  begin with definition exercises for first,  world-systems analysis,  and second,
contemporary globalization. The new understanding is then presented as an adaption







3  World-systems  analysis  is  an  approach  to  understanding  social  change  based  upon
geohistorical systems. These provide a space-time framework for understanding social
change that replaces the orthodox use of nation-state as the basic unit of change (i.e.
space as “homeland territory” and time as “rise of the nation”). Geohistorical systems
denote specific structures of social relations that are concretely realized through time
(trends and cycles) and space (extent and order). The modern world-system is a capitalist
world-economy which is the geohistorical system in which we live. The basic geohistory
is that it was constructed in Europe in the “long” 16 th century, it expanded to cover the
whole world by c.1900 (i.e destroying all other systems), and will meet its demise in the
21st century.
4  Looking at social  change in this  way we find that the basic motor of  the system is
ceaseless  capitalist  accumulation.  This  dominant  process  of  social  change  generates
specific times and spaces.
Structured  times: (i)  cycles (Kondratieff  economic cycles  of  approximately  50 years  length
starting  with  an  A-phase  of  growth  followed  by  a  B-phase  of  stagnation,  and  longer
hegemonic cycles through which one “special” state dominates e.g. the twentieth century as
“American century”) encompassed in (ii) asymptotic trends (such as labour costs, democratic
demands, environmental crisis that are inevitably diminishing the overall rate of profit).
Structured spaces: (i)  division of  labour into core and periphery created by core-producing
(high  tech,  high  wage)  and  periphery-producing  (low  tech,  low  wage)  processes
supplemented by semi-periphery zones where the two processes are relatively balanced, and
governance provided by (ii) multiple states as territorial sovereign units.
5  Although  separated  for  pedagogic  reasons,  these  two  structures  are  intimately
entwined to produce the social space-time structure that is the modern geohistorical
system.
6  This approach to social science was pioneered by Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s.
The first question you should always ask of new knowledge initiatives is about their
own space-time context. What were the key geohistorical challenges that world-systems
analysis was designed to overcome? Drawing on his “first world” experience of the 1968
revolutions that spurned the orthodox “old” left, and his “third world” experience of
severe constraints on national liberation revolutions, Wallerstein directly challenged
the two great geographical myths of the times:
7  Developmentalism – the world is divided into “developed” and “developing” countries;
8  Cold War thinking – the world is divided into “capitalist” and “communist” countries.
9  For Wallerstein, both development and “economic systems” are properties of the whole
historical  systems,  NOT  individual  counties.  World-systems  analysis  was  devised  to
counter these myths.
10  How does this approach interpret the world today? The early twenty first century is a
very unusual, exciting and unstable time for the two very different reasons:
There  is  a  coincidence  of  the  conclusions  of  Kondratieff  (economic  restructuring)  and
hegemonic cycles (political reordering) producing major ordinary stresses in the system
There is the more important coincidence of the asymptotic trends (e.g. effects of treating
environment as “external”) approaching their limits to generate extraordinary crisis in the








demise phase of our modern world-system. Wallerstein calls this an Age of Transition to a new
unknown (unknowable)  world-system. This  challenges the Enlightenment belief  in social
progress as an inevitable feature of social change, an idea translated by socialists into the
“forward march of labour”. 
 
Globalization
11  Globalization comprises a bundle of processes that originated in the 1970s with: 1. the
rise of multinational corporations culminating in “global reach” (a popular book of that
name appeared in 1973) producing a new international division of labour; and 2. the
collapse of Bretton Woods fixed currency arrangements in 1971 culminating in a new
worldwide  financial  market (transcending  national  control);  both  based  upon  3 . 
computing/communication enabling  technology that  made  such  worldwide  organization
possible. 
12  The concept of globalization has been applied to all spheres of social activity – global civil
society, global governance, global culture, and global economy – but it has been the latter
that  has  dominated  the  discourse.  This  is  because  globalization  has  been  closely
associated  with  the  rise  of  neo-liberalism,  the  dismantling  of  state  mechanisms  of
economic  protection and redistribution built  up  throughout  the  twentieth  century.
With  its  privileging  of  market  processes,  proponents  of  globalization  favour,  indeed
famously proclaim, a borderless world.
13  The discourse of globalization is largely a product of the 1990s. There were three key
political  challenges  that  globalization proponents  were  trying  to  overcome.  This
politics was about making all the world attractive to capital:
In the “second world” through the incorporation of the USSR and its sphere of influence with
the end of the Cold War;
In the “third world” through structural adjustment programmes to reduce social expenditure
in the new “unipolar world” (the “Washington consensus”);
In  the  “first  world”  through  cutting  back  on  the  welfare  state  provisions  (Reaganomics,
Thatcherism, TINA – “there is no alternative).
14  Generally, this involved the privatization of state assets, and “opening” state economies
to foreign investment and trade. The end-result was to move from “three worlds” to “one
world” = GLOBALIZATION.
15  Globalization is truly a keyword of our times, overwhelming all other conceptions of
macro-social change in the 1990s. Today it is a hugely contested concept both empirically
and politically. My position is as follows:
Empirically, I accept the evidence for contemporary social change being truly distinctive, in
part, because of the intensity of its global operations;
Politically, I reject the globalization mantra that “there is no alternative”; globalization does
not have to be regressive.












17  How  do  the  two  discourses  on  social  change  relate  to  one  another?  Put  simply:
globalization proponents treat world-systems analysts as “pioneers” of global study but
reject their  systems framework;  while  world systems analysts  consider globalization
proponents as “Johnny-come-latelys” and reject their faith in the “market”. Of course,
both rejections are very fundamental.
18  In some ways it is hard to imagine two approaches to understanding contemporary
social change that could be more different. To begin with, they have wholly contrasting
pedigrees,  one being a coherent, scholarly block of social science knowledge, and the
other  being  a  motley  collection  of  writings,  dominated  by  business  gurus.  This  is
reflected in their respective politics:  neo-Marxist versus neo-liberal and latterly neo-
conservative. Nevertheless, I will argue that instructive comparisons can be made in
terms of their similarities. 
19  I identify three key similarities:
Both  approaches  are  multi-sectoral  but  with  a  focus  on  the  economic:  both  aspire  to
describe macro-social change in the whole based upon a materialist understanding of social
change;
Both approaches place the state at centre-stage in their analyses but so as to to downgrade
it,  as  an  analytical  category  (world-systems  analysis)  or  as  a  political  category
(globalization).
Neither  proposes  a  multi-sectoral  alternative  organization  nexus  to  the  state,  but  both
relate marginally to the literature on world cities.
20  I am going to develop an argument covering all three points but starting in reverse
order: can cities have a future as the organizational nexus of a global economy cum
global civil society cum global governance cum global culture? 
 
Jacobsean social science
21  The social science I am trying to develop takes its name from Jane Jacobs, author of
some  pathbreaking  books  on  economics  and  the  city.  Like  the  two  approaches
previously  described,  she  similarly  rejects  the  state as  a  fundamental  unit  of  social
analysis. Her concern has been what she calls the “myth of the national economy” – she
asks why should politically defined state-spaces delimit economies. However, in this
criticism of state-centric thinking we are provided with a concrete, analytical alternative:
cities and  city-regions.  Thus  she  identifies  “national  economies”  (sic)  as  politically-
defined “mish-mash amalgams of city economies”.  For Jacobs,  dynamic cities are the
starting point for understanding economic life and how it grows.
22  My admiration for Jacobs stems back to her 1984 prediction of the economic demise of
Japanese cities because of their shouldering the burden of the Japanese state (rural-
based political parties squandering urban-generated wealth). Nobody else saw the end
of Japan’s “economic miracle” while it was still in full swing. In the 1990s when she was
proven  correct,  I  began  a  personal  re-evaluation  of  her  work  on  cities  which  has
culminated in my researches on the world city network. Her basic argument is that







vibrant and dynamic through economic interactions within and between cities. Thus
economic growth is equated with dynamic cities, not state development. 
23  I equate Jacobs’ dynamic cities (wherein new work is created, new production replacing
imports that creates a more complex city economy) with Saskia Sassen’s global cities
(wherein massive quantities of new work has been created in professional and financial
services,  referred to in the literature as advanced producer services).  Given that the
latter work is global in scope, I focus on cities as networks,  and the agents of network
formation –  professional  and  financial  service  firms  with  their  worldwide  office
networks (prime contemporary creators of new city work). Thus I treat globalization as
structured through contemporary dynamic cities (global service centres) that form a
world city network.
24  This specific conceptualisation of a contemporary world city network has proven to
have  much  potential  for  empirical  analyses.  By  focussing  on  the  network-making
agents  that  interlock  cities  (such  as  banks)  data  has  been  assembled  that  can  be
modelled to provide estimates of  particular flows between cities.  This relies on the
simple idea that the larger a firm’s office, the more flows (information, instruction,
plans, strategy, advise, etc) to other offices it will generate. Thus through collecting
information on many offices within a city, indirect measures of that city’s links to other
cities can be computed. Following Sassen, this method, using the interlocking network
model,  was  initially  applied  to  advanced producer  service  firms but  application has
subsequently been broadened to other, sometimes non-economic, agents of network
formation.  For  instance,  NGOs  operate  through  cities  across  the  world  and  thus
contribute to their interlocking as a world city network. 
25  In  the  remainder  of  this  lecture  I  present  examples from  my  world  city  network
research to show new geographies  of  globalization,  global spaces of  flows through cities
superseding the international spaces of places that are states. Because only a limited
number of flows can be shown clearly on static diagrams, my illustration shows only
the upper echelons of the world city network. Figure 1 shows the leading world cities
(most connected) and their inter-city relations as defined by the office networks of
advanced  producer  service  work  (in  accountancy,  advertising,  banking/  finance,
insurance, law, and management consultancy). Note that the nine cities break evenly
across the three main globalization arenas, the USA, western Europe and Pacific Asia.
However, within this arrangement, two cities stand out above the rest: London – New
York is “Main Street, World-Economy”. 
 




26  The next two figures show how this global space of flows is organized using world-
systems categories. Figure 2 shows the cities wherein the headquarters of advanced
producer service firms are concentrated. Not as evenly spread as in Figure 1, the eleven
headquarter cities – service control centres – split six in western Europe, four in the US
and just one, Tokyo, in Pacific Asia. This is a map of command power, the loci of service
corporate  decisions  and  from  whence  consequent  instructions  flow  out  across  the
world.  This  is  the  ultimate  core  process  in  the  world city  network and Figure 2  is
therefore a depiction of the core of the world-economy as defined by command power,
highest-level work in the world city network.
 
Figure 2. Global service control centres.
27  But there is another category of power that is intrinsic to all networks, and is clearly
manifest in the world city network. Networks are premised upon collaboration, without
a degree of synergy between the elements, networks disintegrate. Thus, for cities to
form  a  network,  there  must  be  mutuality  between  them  –  city  networks  have  to
encompass co-operative mechanisms to operate. Therefore all cities in a network have
a basic network power, it is the reason they form part of the network. Like other power
categories, network power varies among its holders. Take Hong Kong as an example. It
appears in Figure 1 but not Figure 2 but this does not make it an unimportant world
city. It may have no headquarters of global service corporations but it is a place where
all serious global service players have to be. Hence Hong Kong has immense network
power as the place-to-be for linking the booming Chinese economy to the rest of the
world.  It  is  where  knowledges  about  Chinese  opportunities  criss-cross  professional
knowledges that convert opportunities into practice. Such cities are traditionally called
gateways and I keep this terminology in Figure 3 which depicts the 24 leading gateway
cities  in  the world city  network,  as  defined by numbers of  links for  non-command
cities.  Most  are  national  gateways  (Buenos  Aires,  Toronto,  etc.)  but  seven  are
multinational  including  Miami  and  Zurich  as  centres  for  servicing  regions  of  the






City codes: BA Buenos Aires; BJ Beijing; BK Bangkok; CA Caracas; HK Hong Kong; JB Johannesburg;
JK Jakarta; KL Kuala Lumpur; MB Mumbai; MD Madrid; MI Miami; ML Milan; MS Moscow; MX Mexico
City; PR Prague; SE Seoul; SG Singapore; SH Shanghai; SP Sao Paulo; SY Sydney; TP Taipei;
TR Toronto; WS Warsaw; ZU Zurich).
28  Figure  3  can  be  interpreted  as  depicting  world-systems  spatial  categories  in  the
contemporary global space of flows. The three zones of command power represent the
core,  the  gateways  represent  the  semi-periphery (part  service  core,  part  mega-city
peripheral  processes),  and the rest,  the background of  the map is  the periphery (by
definition a place with no dynamic cities). What I have described is a global space of
flows organized through command world cities, and regional, and national “gateway”
cities that are reproducing the world-systems core-periphery structure
 
Concluding comment
29  I will conclude with another news story dominating the media at the moment: who will
win the US Presidential Election? My purpose is not prediction but to show how the
ideas developed here can be applied to something as inherently “statist” as a national
election.
30  The  two  approaches  I  described  have  fairly  clear-cut  positions  on  this  topic.  For
globalization  proponents,  post-World  War  II  Americanization was  the  precursor  of
globalization,  and the  USA remains  the  “privileged”  power:  Bush  is  exploiting  this
situation and moving the US from a neo-liberal to a neo-conservative trajectory. In
world-systems  analysis,  the  USA  is  in  hegemonic  decline as  it  uses  political-military
power to compensate for declining economic power: just as the growth of the British
Empire occurred after British economic dominance in the industrial revolution, so we
should expect historical figures like Bush to appear, using up American wealth with




undifferentiated  geographical  unit –  I  think a  good dose of  Jacobsean social  science is
needed to rectify this.
31  Current interpretations of  US aggression tend to emphasize the frontier  myth of  US
society,  the  idea  that  the  nineteenth  century  “heroic  winning  if  the  west”  has
imprinted expansionary tendencies in the country’s collective psyche. However, I think
a  rather  different  geohistorical  idea  is  much  more  useful  for  understanding
contemporary US military adventures – sectionalism. In this context “section” means
region, specifically the US division between North and South. US history can be framed
through its North-South divide:
Sectional compromise from Constitution to Civil War
Northern dominance from Civil War to 60s
The rise of South from 60s
32  Figure 4 is a schematic diagram dividing the USA along North-South lines (including a
division of California) showing the different roles of the sections. The North is a world
of makers and traders. Northern cities were the builders of US hegemony: after the Civil
War they made the US the dominant economic power in the world culminating in its
immense pre-eminence in the mid-twentieth century. In contrast the South is a world
of soldiers and circuses. The South got rehabilitated into the US mainstream through
its military tradition that was found to be so useful in the twentieth century’s two
world wars. Along side the numerous army and navy bases we find the playground of
America  in  music  (New  Orleans  jazz,  Memphis  blues,  Nashville  country),  films
(Hollywood) and vacations (Disneyland, Disneyworld,  Las Vegas).  Wealth historically
created  in  the  North  is  squandered  in  the  South,  both  domestically  (play)  and
internationally (war and military bases). The key point is that since the 1960s the South
has finally “won the Civil War” which translates internationally to building a US empire,
which is a good shorthand for Bush’s interventionist, unilateralist, foreign policy.
 
Figure 4. USA: Northern and Southern Cities in the World-Economy.
33  How  does  this  relate  to  the  upcoming  election?  “Winning  the  Civil  War”  in







politician from the North to win the presidency. (There is another President from the
North, Gerald Ford of Michigan, but he only became President when Nixon resigned; in
the next election he lost to the Southerner Carter.)  The lesson is:  Southerners beat
Northerners  whatever  the  party  labels.  Bush  is  from  Texas,  Kerry  is  from
Massachusetts, ’nuff said.
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